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ABSTRACT 
Recreational cannabis was legalized in Canada on October 17, 2018 and has created new 
business and income for the country. Focusing on Ontario, this paper analyzes how the province 
failed to benefit from legalization during its first year. As a result of the change in provincial 
government—which led to ineffective sales models, delays, and financial losses—Ontario has 
failed in cannabis legalization. Using the theory of federalism, this paper explores the division of 
power within Canada’s levels of government and its impact on cannabis legalization and sales. 
Further, this paper includes a case study on Alberta and its free-market success with alcohol and 
cannabis to assess Ontario’s rollout of cannabis sales and argues that, despite the failures of its 
first year, Ontario has potential for success in the future. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
On October 17, 2018, the Canadian government legalized the recreational use of cannabis 
through The Cannabis Act. The main goals of this federal legislation are to shield youth, keep 
profits from criminals, and protect public health by offering a safe supply.1 The Cannabis Act 
mandated that provincial governments regulate the distribution of cannabis, determine the legal 
age of cannabis consumption, set rules for individual and private possession, create growth 
parameters, decide on public areas where cannabis could be consumed, and implement province-
specific roadside tolerance policies. This paper examines the first year of legalization in Canada, 
focusing on the province of Ontario. It will argue that the first year of legalization in Ontario was 
a failure and will analyze why this was the case. 
It is important to note the change of Ontario’s government from Liberal to Conservative 
during the rollout of legalization as well as how it affected the sales model the province used. 
The sales model changed from a mainly government-controlled entity to one that allowed private 
retailers to govern the market. A review of the first year of cannabis legalization in Ontario 
reveals that delays in opening store fronts, determining the logistics of commerce, and the 
financial losses incurred when cannabis did not bring in the profit it was expected to, led to 
failure. The inability to overcome these issues during its first year of legalization created 
challenges for Ontario. Even though Ontario’s first year failed in comparison to other provinces, 
success is still possible through the free-market approach it has adopted.  
Grounded in understanding federalism’s framework, this paper will examine the way 
federalism affects public policy in Canada in regard to the legalization of cannabis. The 
 
1. The Cannabis Act, Statutes of Canada 2018 (CA) https://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-24.5/.   
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theoretical framework of federalism highlights the importance of understanding that “each order 
of governance is autonomous within its [own] sphere of authority” however, this autonomy may 
be rendered powerless within their realm of responsibility when higher levels of government 
intervene.2 This paper will scrutinize provincial responsibilities as well as power and provide a 
brief case study of alcohol regulation in Alberta compared to their cannabis legalization thus far. 
This example will contrast Ontario’s government-controlled alcohol market to Alberta’s free-
market as well as how both provinces have handled cannabis legalization.  
This paper will reveal that the federal government’s The Cannabis Act placed restrictions 
on provinces such as Ontario and contributed to the delays and financial losses incurred during 
the first year of legalization. Nevertheless, the province can still succeed due to the current free-
market sales model in place. This paper will focus on the shift of Ontario’s government from 
Liberal to Conservative leadership as a key development in the legalization process. Elaborating, 
it will examine the extent to which the Conservative government amended its predecessor’s 
plans for legalization and whether they were successful during this first legal year.3  
This paper will proceed in the following manner: a brief review of the history of cannabis 
and its medical legalization in Canada, to its recreational legalization; an explanation of 
federalism and its relevance to the provincial level of government; a description of the shift from 
Liberal to Conservative government in Ontario; and how the shift to private sales has promise for 
the future of legal cannabis use in Ontario. The projected success of a free-market and a private 
 
2. Herman, Bakvis and Grace Skogstad, eds., Canadian Federalism: Performance, 
Effectiveness and Legitimacy, (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2002), 2. 
 
3. Ministry of the Attorney General, “Ontario's Plan to Regulate Legalized Cannabis,” 
Government of Ontario, September 8, 2017, https://news.ontario.ca/mag/en/2017/09/ontarios-
plan-to-regulate-legalized-cannabis.html. 
  3 
sales model will be demonstrated through an evaluation of alcohol operations in the province of 
Alberta. Through this comparison, we will be able to conclude that, despite the Conservative 
government’s initial failures with cannabis, Ontario is still on route for success.   
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CHAPTER II: HISTORY OF CANNABIS LEGALIZATION 
 Cannabis regulation has been a difficult subject since 1923, when Parliament originally 
criminalized the substance with no clear justification.4 It was not until the early 1990s that access 
to medical cannabis was granted to medical patients under extreme circumstances.5 After the R. 
v. Parker 2000 case, a court case revolving around Terry Parker who used cannabis to help his 
epilepsy, the first policy was created. The Medical Marijuana Access Regulations 2001 (the 
MMAR) was a set of regulations that “surveyed production, distribution and [the] use of 
marijuana for medicinal purposes.”6 The MMAR was soon replaced by Marijuana for Medical 
Purposes Regulations 2013 (MMPR), followed by the Access to Cannabis for Medical Purposes 
Regulations 2016 (ACMPR), which remains in place today. The ACMPR reinstated “personal 
production program” that the MMAR had previously installed, which is similar to personal 
allowances under The Cannabis Act.7 Nationally, medical cannabis must be purchased from a 
federally licensed producer and delivered by a postal services carrier.  
The Liberal Party of Canada promised in 2015, under the leadership of Justin Trudeau, to 
legalize and regulate cannabis for recreational use.8 As such, the Liberal Party’s initial plan for 
 
4. Catherine Carstairs, Jailed for Possession: Illegal Drug Use, Regulation, and Power in 
Canada, 1920-1961 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 31. 
 
5. Benedikt Fischer, Sharan Kuganesan, and Robin Room, “Medical Marijuana 
Programs: Implications for Cannabis Control Policy – Observations from Canada,” International 
Journal of Drug Policy 26, no. 1(2015): 16, 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0955395914002734?via=ihub. 
 
6. Fischer, Kuganesan, and Room “Medical Marijuana” 18. 
 
7. “What Is the ACMPR?,” Canabo Medical Clinic, August 30, 2018, 
https://www.canabomedicalclinic.com/what-is-the-acmpr/. 
 
8. Josh Elliott, “Liberals ‘Committed’ to Legalizing Marijuana: Trudeau,” CTV News, 
September 30, 2015, https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/election/liberals-committed-to-legalizing-
marijuana-trudeau-1.2588260. 
  5 
decriminalization involved professional input from law enforcement and sought to introduce a 
strictly regulated system of profit and distribution in a government-controlled setting.9 They 
fulfilled their promise by introducing and passing The Cannabis Act. The Cannabis Act, first 
introduced in 2016 as Bill C-45, underwent extensive parliamentary scrutiny and debate before 
passing in 2018 and making cannabis legal on October 17th of that same year. It was revised in 
October 2019 as well and was further expanded on based on the first year’s findings. For 
example, The Cannabis Act controls the types of products being sold, including dried cannabis 
and cannabis oil and, more recently in 2019, subcategories including topicals, extract for 
ingesting and extract for inhaling were added.10 
Furthermore, The Cannabis Act lays out the responsibilities of each level of government 
(federal, provincial, and municipal) in the legalization of cannabis. Federally, the government 
creates basic restrictions that each province must follow and build upon. For example, on the 
medical market, organizations such as Health Canada, a federal agency that monitors and audits 
licensed producers, help companies create quality procedures and regulations. These regulations 
allow the companies to control and track the production of cannabis through measures such as 
requiring medical documents to be written by physicians.  
The Cannabis Act only extends certain responsibilities to the provinces and territories 
such as determining the age at which cannabis can be purchased, the number of plants that can be 
grown and used, the workplace safety regulations, the penalty for youth offences, and the 
 
9. Liberal Party of Canada A New Plan for a Strong Middle Class (Ottawa: Liberal Party 
of Canada, 2015), p.55. 
 
10. The Cannabis Act, Statutes of Canada 2018 (CA) https://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-24.5/. 
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regulations regarding home cultivation and possession.11  Specifically, the provinces are 
responsible for establishing a license, distribution, and sales model. Through regulation, The 
Cannabis Act ultimately gives provinces the same responsibility as they have with respect to 
alcohol.12 The cannabis policy affected all of Canada.  
This paper, however, will focus on Ontario because of its economic importance to the 
nation. The legalization of recreational cannabis brought forth a third option, a physical 
storefront, which had notable consequences for every province but arguably the most significant 
impact was on Ontario. In analyzing these changes, it is important to understand the power and 
authority of various levels of government as well as how Canada’s governing system works. 
  
 
11. Chelsea Cox, “Cannabis in Canada: Municipal, Provincial & Federal 
Responsibilities,” Legal Information Society of Nova Scotia, 2019, 
https://www.legalinfo.org/legal-information-topics/cannabis-in-canada-municipal-provincial-
federal-responsibilities. 
 
12. The Cannabis Act, Statutes of Canada 2018 (CA) https://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-24.5/. 
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CHAPTER III: FEDERALISM 
Canada is a multicultural and diverse entity under the emblem of a “single nation-state.”13 
As such, dealing with its divisions of power could be difficult if it were not for federalism. 
Federalism is an idea that combines a shared rule on the federal, provincial, and local municipal 
levels of government. It encompasses three levels of power that allows self-rule on specific local 
issues or decisions pertaining to a region’s identity.14 It is most important to note that the three 
levels of government, federal, provincial, and municipal, are not equal. Municipalities can be 
referred to as “creatures of the province,” and are notably not included in the constitution.15 
Thus, comparing them to provincial, and federal rule is not productive.  
Within the Canadian federal system, the federal government adopted legislation to 
legalize the use of cannabis, which the provincial governments implemented within their 
respective jurisdictions.  Federalism reinforces “that each order of government is autonomous 
within its sphere of authority.”16  Evidently, passing The Cannabis Act forces provinces to create 
restrictions and for municipalities to conform with new federal law. This paper will demonstrate 
how these changes occurred in provincial governments and how federalism allowed for various 
public policy making as seen in the examples of Ontario and a comparison with Alberta. 
Federalism allows for policy experimentation and policy flexibility in its implementation 
 
13. Herman, Bakvis and Grace Skogstad, eds., Canadian Federalism: Performance, 
Effectiveness and Legitimacy, (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2002), 2. 
 
14. Bakvis and Skogstad, Canadian Federalism, 2. 
 
 15. Kristin R. Good, “Municipalities Deserve More Autonomy and Respect,” Policy 
Options, November 29, 2019, https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/november-
2019/municipalities-deserve-more-autonomy-and-respect/. 
 
16. Good, “Municipalities,” 2. 
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compared to a unitary state. Some provinces, such as Alberta, made extensive preparations for 
legalization and were able to put in a private sales model. Others, such as Ontario, had to rush 
their decisions and processes due to a provincial election and had to change decisions already put 
in place by the previous governing provincial party. As such, the process of legalization occurred 
differently in each of them. 
Contrary to Ontario, Alberta handled the first year of cannabis legalization through 
effective preparation and efficient decision making. Ontario and Alberta took different 
approaches in implementing the legalization of cannabis.  A case study of these provinces in 
Chapter VI will provide an example of the variation that public policy may have in a federal 
system.  
In the case of Ontario’s cannabis legalization, the province was slow to authorize store 
fronts for sale of the now-legal substance. Ontario also failed to create a steady financial income 
from retail stores, and failed to lure consumers away from the illicit market. Although the federal 
government created The Cannabis Act, Ontario made its own decisions when implementing the 
legalization of cannabis but was overpowered in some respects by The Cannabis Act which laid 
out obligatory guidelines for provinces to follow. Federal systems are complicated and remain 
unpredictable. This is not only as a result of the division of power between two levels of 
government (federal and provincial), but also because they are subject to political change, as was 
demonstrated in the province of Ontario.  
  
  9 
CHAPTER IV: LEGALIZATION IN ONTARIO 
In 2017, the Ontario Liberals prided themselves on creating a safe and sensible 
framework for the legalization of cannabis. The provincial Liberal government’s plan was in line 
with the federal government’s original three main goals of minimizing public harm by protecting 
minors, providing a safe and reliable method of sale as well as deterring illicit sales. This plan 
was made under a strict timeframe with a target legalization date of July 1st, 2018. The Liberals 
felt this tight deadline was essential to maintaining control over the legalization process for the 
province. They promised a minimum age of 19 for legal use, that the Liquor Control Board of 
Ontario (LCBO) would oversee the legal retail operation through the Ontario Cannabis Store 
(OCS), and that they would close illicit cannabis dispensaries.17  
The provincial Liberal government’s plans for legalizing cannabis occurred at the same 
time as the support for the government was declining. This drop in support led to their defeat in 
the 2018 election, which ultimately impacted the outcome of the legalization of cannabis in 
Ontario.18 The original cannabis legalization plan initiated by the Liberal government was 
implemented and administered by the Conservative Party of Ontario following their victory in 
the 2018 provincial election.  
The Conservative government took office in June 2018. Their election platform called for 
“prosperity that will benefit every resident of Ontario,” while reiterating that the province was 
 
17. Ministry of the Attorney General, “Ontario Releases Safe and Sensible Framework 
To Manage Federal Legalization of Cannabis,” Government of Ontario, September 8, 2017), 
https://news.ontario.ca/mag/en/2017/09/ontario-releases-safe-and-sensible-framework-to-
manage-federal-legalization-of-cannabis.html. 
 
18. Tim Alamenciak, Chantal Braganza, and Daniel Kitts, “The Good, the Bad, and the 
Ugly: A Look Back at 15 Years of Liberal Government,” TVO, June 15, 2018, 
https://www.tvo.org/article/the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-a-look-back-at-15-years-of-liberal-
government. 
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“open for business”.19;20 This platform allowed the supply and price of cannabis to be determined 
by market forces. Upon taking office, the Conservative government’s first prominent change to 
the legalization policies pertained to the Liberal government’s planned OCS stores. The Liberal 
government had planned for the OCS to operate locally and be the sole store front for 
recreational cannabis. Additionally, Ontario was planning to involve the public by allowing them 
to submit questions and comments before the stores were put in place in their communities. The 
Conservative government changed the concept of OCS stores and made it clear that they did not 
wish to have as rigid a control on the market as the Liberals had originally proposed. The 
Conservatives deemed the OCS the official provincial online wholesaler but allowed private 
retailers to engage in physical sales to the public. This opened the opportunity for private retail, 
reinforcing the free-market approach endorsed by Doug Ford, the Conservative Premier of 
Ontario, and supported by the cannabis industry.21 Ford believed in free-markets and wanted to 
have private retailers involved in the way cannabis was sold. He used his power to establish what 
qualifies as a retail storefront as well as a private sales model.22  While changing parts of the 
sales model, the Conservative government kept other parts consistent with the Liberals’ previous 
 
19. “Doug Ford’s victory speech: ‘Ontario is open for business’ — full transcript” 
Macleans, June, 7 2018, 
https://www.macleans.ca/politics/doug-fords-victory-speech-ontario-is-open-for-business-full-
transcript/. 
 
20. Jacob Lorinc and Arik Ligeti, “Morning Update: Doug Ford's Victory and What It 
Means for Ontario,” The Globe and Mail, June 8, 2018, 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-morning-update-doug-fords-victory-and-what-
it-means-for-ontario/. 
 
21. Geoff Zochodne, “Ontario Cannabis Regime in Political Crosshairs,” Financial Post, 
March 14, 2018, https://business.financialpost.com/business/doug-ford-opens-door-to-looser-
cannabis-sales-in-ontario-and-the-industry-doesnt-hate-it. 
 
22. Zochodne, “Ontario Cannabis.” 
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plan. The Conservatives made sure the age for use, possession, and growth of recreational 
cannabis were aligned with the legal age for the sale and consumption of tobacco and alcohol.  
The federal, provincial, and municipal governments all face a difficult problem when it 
comes to deterring young people from cannabis use. Federally, The Cannabis Act aims to protect 
the health of young people - as seen in section 7 of The Cannabis Act23 - by limiting their access 
to cannabis and reducing incentives and colourful packaging that may encourage the use of 
cannabis among youth. Ontario adopted the federally suggested age of 19 to match the age of 
alcohol consumption, as did many provinces. It was previously shown by the Canadian Medical 
Association (CMA) that human brains do not fully develop until they are in their early 20s. 
Canadians are near the top of a list of the 43 countries in the world who have the youngest users - 
some being as young as 15.24 Ontario-specific studies demonstrate that 19% of youth aged 12-18 
consumed cannabis within the year they were surveyed.25 Thus, we can see that criminalization, 
as strict as it was, still failed to deter youth from consumption. The higher the legal age, the 
likelier the use of cannabis by underaged youth.26  However, in spite of creating an appropriate 
age of use and tackling one of The Cannabis Act’s main goals of protecting the youth, the 
industry still faced initial failure during its first year.  
 
23. The Cannabis Act, Statutes of Canada 2018 (CA) ss. 7. https://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-24.5/. 
 
24. Lorian Hardcastle, “Decriminalization of Cannabis and Canadian Youth,” University 
of Calgary Faculty of Law, December 3, 2018, https://ablawg.ca/2018/12/03/decriminalization-
of-cannabis-and-canadian-youth/. 
 
25. Hardcastle, “Decriminalization.” 
 
26. Hardcastle, “Decriminalization.” 
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The Conservative government adopted many of the guidelines and decisions already set 
out by its predecessor Liberal government. The main element they changed was the sales model, 
something with which the province had no prior experience. This decision might have hindered 
the speed of legalization due to the implementation of the lottery system. This system chose who 
was able to open a private store at random.27  
Cannabis regulation in the province of Ontario encompasses everything from minimizing 
public harm by protecting minors, to providing a safe and reliable method of sale. This aimed to 
achieve The Cannabis Act’s three main goals (protecting the youth, upholding public safety and 
stopping illicit sales). The legalization process sped up when the new Conservative government 
tried to make a deadline for legalization. Upon further scrutiny, it is evident that the new 
provincial government still followed the stipulations in The Cannabis Act itself but was unable to 
perform with effectiveness or efficiency. While attempting to complete the implementation as 
quickly as possible and having to subject to federal regulations, the province of Ontario 
experienced delays and financial losses. 
  
 
27. Mark Blinch, “Doug Ford, Year One: A Recap of Ontario's Tumultuous 12 Months,” 
The Globe and Mail, June 20, 2019, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-doug-ford-
year-one-ontario-premier-explainer/. 
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CHAPTER V: FIRST YEAR ANALYSIS 
DELAYS 
With the turn to private retailers and the province in charge of wholesaling products, 
several delays occurred, most notably when only nine of the original 25 stores opened on April 1, 
2018.28 Currently, there are 28 legal cannabis stores in Ontario because of the government lottery 
licensing system that had been in place.29 Due to this lottery system, Canadians were not granted 
physically accessible legal cannabis and had either the OCS, as an online source, or the illicit 
market as their options for purchase.  
 The delay occurred due to the lengthy approval process put in place by the Conservative 
government.30 As previously mentioned, the method Ontario had chosen was a lottery system, 
described as arbitrary and without merit by Lawyer Caryma Sa's.31 This system showed promise 
by having no bias and selecting its recipients at random. Furthermore, the Conservative 
government initially stated that there would not be a limit on retail stores, alluding to multiple 
store fronts.32 However, in December 2018, the government decided to issue only 25 licenses for 
the coming April.33 Now, in 2020, the lottery system has been “scrapped” and the province 
 
28. Blinch, “Doug Ford.” 
 
29. “Cannabis Canada: Doug Ford Expects Ontario to Lead the Nation in Pot Shop 
Locations - Article,” BNN Bloomberg, last modified January 30, 2020, 
https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/cannabis-canada-1.1382496. 
 
30. Shawn Jeffords and Armina Ligaya, “Over Half of Ontario Cannabis Store Openings 
Delayed,” Canadian Underwriter, April 3, 2019, https://www.canadianunderwriter.ca/risk/over-
half-of-ontario-cannabis-store-openings-delayed-1004161582/. 
 
31. Jeffords and Ligaya, “Over Half.” 
 
 32. Jeffords and Ligaya, “Over Half.” 
 
 33. Jeffords and Ligaya, “Over Half.” 
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promised to open up an abundance of cannabis stores under new regulations but has only added 3 
new stores to the provinces total since the beginning of the year.34 Store openings are still being 
delayed, with “over 600 applications for cannabis shops waiting for approval,” regardless of the 
new systems put in place.35 
Furthermore, as a precaution to prevent supply issues, Ontario’s finance minister Victor 
Fedeli directed stores to open up in phases, so as to not overwhelm the public. This approach, 
however, represented a shift from the original Conservative open-market system and created 
further time constraints. The Liberal plan was to open 40 stores on the original date of 
legalization, July 1, 2018, and have 150 operating by the end of the year 2020. Fedeli countered 
this plan by explaining that Quebec had suffered supply shortages and had to limit their stores’ 
operating days due to lack of supply and believed that Ontario would have suffered the same fate 
if they had rushed store openings.36 Analysts predicted within the first two years that the losses 
would be significant until 2020-2021 when Ontario’s portion of federal cannabis excise duties 
and the Ontario Cannabis Retail Corporation’s net income would be almost at par.37 
Today, the OCS uniquely operates online, and it is the private retailers who have the 
physical storefronts. The OCS corporation, authorized by the Alcohol and Gaming Commission 
 
 34. Colin Butler, “Here's What Scrapping the Ontario Cannabis Retail Lottery Means for 
London in 2020,” CBC News, December 15, 2019, 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/london/london-ontario-cannabis-stores-1.5395242. 
 
35. “Cannabis Canada: Doug Ford Expects Ontario to Lead the Nation in Pot Shop 
Locations - Article,” BNN Bloomberg, January 30, 2020, 
https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/cannabis-canada-1.1382496. 
 
36. Travis Dhanraj, “Ontario Government Changes Rules for Pot Shops, Only 25 Stores 
to Open April 1,” Global News, December 13, 2018, 
https://globalnews.ca/news/4761165/ontario-government-pot-shops-opening/. 
 
37. Dhanraj, “Ontario Government.” 
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of Ontario, is funded and governed by the province. Recreational cannabis can either be 
purchased online from the OCS (which sells regulated products from all over Canada) or from a 
physical storefront authorized by the Alcohol and Gaming Commission, thus fulfilling The 
Cannabis Act’s goal of a safe and reliable supply for adult users. 
One major difference between the Liberal and Conservative plans relates to the private 
sale of cannabis. Instead of giving the Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO) sole control 
over cannabis sold through the OCS outlet, the Conservative government allowed for licensed 
and regulated private stores to distribute cannabis products. They determined how cannabis 
would be sold, which, consequently, delayed in-person sales because of the shift from a 
province-led retail model to a private retail model, to a lottery system to eliminating the lottery 
system.38  This decision allowed Ontario to attempt to stop illegal businesses by providing a safe 
and reliable method of distribution. In theory, monitoring any controlled substance is easier 
when a government corporation oversees the distribution of the substance to the public. 
Currently, Ontario does this monitoring through the OCS, a licensed retail seller, much like the 
LCBO stores.  
The Ontario government faced several challenges, many specifically pertaining to the 
short time in which they had to complete legalization. Due to time constraints laid out by The 
Cannabis Act, many delays occurred in supply chains, such as the requirement for third-party 
testing, which can take up to three weeks to obtain approval before releasing product for sale. 
New products require 60-day waiting periods with Health Canada before being made available to 
 
38. Moira Warburton, “Ontario's Slow Rollout of Weed Stores Could Help the Black 
Market Thrive for Longer,” Financial Post, July 8, 2019, 
https://business.financialpost.com/cannabis/cannabis-news/cannabis-legislation/ontarios-slow-
rollout-of-weed-stores-could-help-the-black-market-thrive-for-longer. 
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the public, and the ‘Good Production Practices ‘subject companies to maintain rigid quality-
assurance and controls before releasing a product. These restrictions contribute towards delaying 
product availability while the illicit market progresses further and continues to remain the 
government’s greatest competition.39 
In regard to workplace regulations, consumption of recreational cannabis remains illegal, 
while medical cannabis is held to the standard of most prescription drugs. However, its 
recreational counterpart is treated cautiously. Researchers, such as Robin Room, repeatedly state 
that cannabis users are still at risk while under the influence, comparing the drug’s effects on 
drivers to alcohol impairment.40 Legally, users can smoke or vape cannabis in six designated 
areas: private residences, outdoor public places (such as smoking pits), designated smoking guest 
rooms, residential vehicles and boats, scientific research and testing facilities, and controlled 
areas. Municipal bylaws may add more restrictions on where users can and cannot consume. At 
this time, smoking cannabis is prohibited in indoor common areas, places where children gather, 
many universities, hospitals, hospices, publicly owned spaces, and vehicles and boats that are 
being driven or will be driven in the near future. These restrictions, though essential, may further 
delay law enforcement’s ability to manage the substance due to the need for additional training 
and unforeseen circumstances with impairment that research will continue to uncover. 
 
 39. Health Canada, “Guidance Document: Good Production Practices Guide for 
Cannabis,” Government of Canada, December 4, 2019, https://www.canada.ca/en/health-
canada/services/cannabis-regulations-licensed-producers/good-production-practices-
guide/guidance-document.html#appe. 
 
40. Robin Room, Cannabis Policy: Moving beyond Stalemate (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 18. 
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Although some of these delays did stem from timeframes outlined by The Cannabis Act, 
it is the planning and lack of time-sensitive implementation created by the province that led to 
these initial problems. 
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FINANCIAL LOSSES 
One of the most notable features of the first year of cannabis legalization was the 
financial cost to the province. In the 2019 fiscal year, Ontario made $64 million through 
cannabis sales; however, the province lost $42 million from privately operated sales and online 
OCS sales.41  This does not account for the excise tax, a cannabis specific tax on all cannabis 
products placed by the federal government. This omission is problematic when analyzing these 
numbers because it omits the profit the federal government has made. The OCS generated $64 
million in the 2018-2019 fiscal year, but its expenses were $106 million, significantly higher 
than the $6 million reported in the 2017-2018 fiscal year. This was largely because the OCS was 
not able “to book wholesale revenue from selling into the first wave of physical retail stores in 
the latest fiscal year.”42 
Despite legalization, the illicit market continues to thrive and outsell the government 
because of the competitive prices offered. According to Statistics Canada, cannabis prices from 
the legal market were on average 40% higher than those on the illicit market.43 The illicit market 
also has a number of products available that are not available in legal storefronts, such as high-
tetrahydrochloride (THC) dosed edibles, a form of ingestible cannabis that have only came to 
legal shelves in early 2020 with a 10% THC restriction. Non-regulated retailers and sellers have 
 
41. David George-Cash, “Ontario’s Cannabis Business Posts $42-Million Loss in Last 
Fiscal Year,” BNN, September 13, 2019,   
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ignored the government’s restrictions in favour of their own affordable and readily available 
product.44 Thus, Ontario’s prohibitive approach on THC restrictions in edible and ingestible 
products facilitates the illicit market’s success as they can provide products that bypass these 
restrictions.45 Some of these regulations can be associated directly with The Cannabis Act, which 
implemented additional costs with growing under the ‘Good Production Practices’ and therefore 
poses a challenge when competing with the illicit market.46 
These failures dominated the first year of cannabis sales in Ontario but do not define its 
future. Ontario’s cannabis industry has failed to be profitable but shows promise as a result of the 
free-market model that is now in place. This will open the market to the public, but its success 
depends on how quickly they can administer store licenses, which is a dilemma at the moment. 
Though the primary focus of the Conservative budget in 2019 was alcohol sales, renewed focus 
on the free-market for cannabis may present an opportunity to re-evaluate the sales model.47 
Ontario, which has only had government-regulated entities managing legal substances, such as 
the LCBO, is new to the free-market approach and can learn from the example Alberta has 
already set with alcohol and cannabis. The next section will provide a brief analysis of Alberta’s 
alcohol sales model in order to understand how a privatized market may have advantages over a 
provincial government-controlled approach. 
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CHAPTER VI: COMPARING ONTARIO AND ALBERTA 
This section will use a case study to further explicate the potential of Ontario’s free-
market sales model by examining the success the model has had with Alberta’s alcohol sales. 
The sale of alcohol has been a highly successful business in the province of Alberta, employing 
thousands of citizens and boosting revenue through a private sales model. In 1993-1994, Alberta 
privatized the sale of alcohol at remarkable speed. There were 202 government run liquor stores 
operating on the day of privatization in September 1993. Within three months, two-thirds of 
those stores had closed, and after six months, once the initial decision to privatize occurred, all of 
the remaining stores closed in early March 1994.48 The private sector now operates 1,982 retail 
outlets and the number of products offered increased from 2,200 in 1993 to over 19,000 
presently. In the fiscal year of 2017-2018, sales were $866 million dollars.49 Alberta offers 
competitive prices, the highest social responsibility, and a three-billion-dollar industry. The 
province has a fully open free-market that does not block products from other provinces or 
countries, thus vendors and store owners have ample opportunity to introduce their customers to 
new products.50 As an example of their varieties, individual Albertan liquor stores offer a greater 
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selection of beers than all of Ontario.51 Most importantly, the Alberta Gaming, Liquor & 
Cannabis (AGLC) has a 90% consumer satisfaction rating.52 
However, despite these innovative practices, there are some critics. The self-labeled 
Consumers Association ran a study and speculated that Alberta’s prices were higher than those 
of British Columbia due to the privatization model. In addition, Parkland Institute’s David 
Campanella and Greg Flanagan claimed that the province lost $1.5 billion in revenue.53 
However, both accusations have been challenged. The Consumers Association only used 
medians on certain products in their study and ignored the Real Canadian Liquor Store chain, a 
substantial contributor to alcohol sales. Parkland Institute’s claims on lost revenue were 
countered by Mark Milke from the Huffington Post. Milke conducted a study in 2002 and 
compared the lowest available prices on over 1,800 products before finding that beer, wine and 
spirits were cheaper in Alberta in a fair analysis.54 Campanella and Flanagan, who had claimed 
that the province suffered significant losses, did not reflect the markups on beers and wines that 
had reaped $729 million in 2013 on their own.55 There are many analyses that fail to see the true 
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benefit of a free-market.56 Some analysts and policy gurus believe that because the number of 
products has been slightly reduced over the years in Alberta, the Ontario LCBO model is 
successful in comparison. This is a false claim because the number of products in Alberta still 
exceeds the variety available in Ontario. The number of products available in each province 
differs as well as the different ways that alcohol is governed in free-markets and government-
controlled markets. There were also claims made by Ontario's Beer Store that a 24-pack of Coors 
Light costs more in Alberta.57 This is contradictory because the Beer Store is owned by Labatt’s 
and Molson (National Brewers) who set the price of their product in each province.58   
We can infer that the privatization of business enables more creative freedom for store 
owners as well as opportunities for jobs and economic growth. Alberta’s provincial government 
effectively and efficiently conquered alcohol sales and obtained legitimacy from its public by 
their service. This change allowed the people of Alberta to see these stores in their community 
and support them, as demonstrated through their high approval rating. Supporting business 
owners as opposed to just another government-run monopoly appeals to Albertans. In regard to 
cannabis, Ontario has been given the opportunity to establish a free-market of similar capacity to 
that of Alberta; having led by example, Alberta once again tackled the issues of regulation and 
utilization of a free-market approach head on and quickly. 
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ALBERTA’S CANNABIS SUCCESS 
Ontario had a slow start in establishing retail outlets for cannabis. Alberta had 283 stores 
within the first year and continues to expand that number, offering a greater opportunity to 
collect data and interpret customer behaviour in this budding market.59 This resulted from two 
main factors: the province’s free-market approach and the manner in which the province of 
Ontario prepared itself for cannabis legalization.  
Alberta took a free-market approach with cannabis, as with alcohol, and had more than 
300 cannabis private retail stores within the first two years, most of them in city centers such as 
Edmonton and Calgary.60 City centers are where the majority of the population is concentrated 
and allows for the best profit potential. To further elaborate how the province of Alberta was 
able to succeed it is important to highlight that they were not interrupted by a provincial election, 
as was the case in Ontario. Their decision making led to Calgary leading the nation with 85 
licensed stores. They started panels and discussions with health experts and local entrepreneurs 
as early as February 2017. This early jump to action ensured Calgary had a say in provincial and 
federal regulation drafts while researching other jurisdictions (such as those in the United States) 
and their successes in the cannabis industry. Bylaws were determined months before legalization 
as well as virtual mapping systems so citizens could find their stores online.  
After a few issues in the beginning, such as a freeze on new retail licenses the week after 
legalization day, Alberta reported $24.5 million in sales of legal recreational cannabis before the 
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end of 2018.61 This brought the province to 38 percent of all legal sales in Canada, leading the 
country in purchases per capita.62 This early success was extraordinary and due mainly to 
Alberta’s speed in adapting its system to the legislation.  
Ontario’s success foundered on one main challenge: the transition from Liberal to 
Conservative government, which left the province re-creating their plan for legalization. Ontario 
had only 25 cannabis retail stores in the first year of legalization to serve 14 million people while 
Alberta, a province of only 4 million people, had almost 200 stores within the same timeframe.63 
Ontario has not made substantial profits nor created a significant increase in retail stores over the 
first year and, as a result, has underserved its population. It has not made sufficient efforts to stop 
the illicit market, nor has it generated a significant industry growth or tax revenue yet. The 
current plan is to authorize 20 retail stores per month under the new non-lottery system, but 
Ontario will not reach 1000 stores until 2024. A faster rate, as mentioned by co-chair of the 
Ontario Cannabis Policy Council, Daniel Safayeni, would improve the market and consumer 
satisfaction.64 A faster rate of store openings could help Ontario’s consumers’ rating and uphold 
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the legitimate value of federalism within the provincial government. The OCS still acts as the 
province’s exclusive wholesaler and online retailer, as originally designed in the Liberal 
government’s plan. However, a licensed producer’s relationship with retailers would allow for 
independent retailers and craft licensed producers to come forth and offer new products to the 
market. 
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CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION 
The future of cannabis in Ontario is still unclear, and policies will be amended as time 
passes. The shift in provincial parties and policies and a year of unsuccessfully tackled 
challenges has left Ontario in an ambiguous situation. Ontario failed in its first year in terms of 
delays and finances but set up the province for future success with the private sector and free-
market approach, as proposed by the Conservative government. Based on Alberta’s rising liquor 
and cannabis sales, this can be seen as a potential road to success. Furthermore, Ontario has 
tackled two of the three goals of The Cannabis Act of having safe and reliable product and 
keeping it out of the hands of youth but has yet to fully conquer the illicit market, a challenge the 
nation faces as a whole. 
The Cannabis Act itself is flawed and differs greatly from the campaign promises that the 
federal Liberal Party made in 2015. Their platform endorsed decriminalization of cannabis 
possession, a joint task force with the provinces and the federal government, and the input of 
professionals in sectors such as law enforcement to create a strictly regulated system of profit 
and distribution.65 
 Legalization is functional in theory but has proven logistically difficult in practice, as 
clearly illustrated by how a Liberal plan has been carried out by the Conservative government. 
There have been many challenges associated with training and education, more commonly 
known as “start-up costs,” which played a large part in the losses within the first year of 
legalization.66  
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The future of legalization depends on continued federal and provincial action. In Canada, 
federalism aims to remove barriers by having the federal government delegate the majority of the 
responsibility to local bodies to ensure fair and transparent channels of power. These channels 
are established so that local bodies can maintain an understanding of what citizens want and still 
receive access to information. Even though the provinces created their own guidelines and 
legislation in regard to cannabis legalization, The Cannabis Act itself still stipulates and governs 
certain processes. This is demonstrated through agencies such as Health Canada and the ‘Good 
Production Practices’ that licensed producers must follow. Cannabis sales and regulation are not 
something that one level of government can tackle on its own; rather, it requires an effort from 
all levels of government. The input of provinces and licensed producers could better address 
future market needs and improve sales.  
There are concerns that it may take provinces including Ontario and Alberta a few years 
to turn a significant profit. Currently, the AGLC regulates online retail sales and its budget 
reflects its reality in which the costs of retail and administrative set up exceeds the potential for 
sales. The organization’s spokeswoman, Heather Holman, said that generating a profit from 
selling cannabis wholesale to private retailers may take a few years because the government is 
not charging the whole markup price to retailers in an attempt to appeal to consumers and deter 
illicit market sales.67 This profit is reflected in the excise tax the government collects as well as 
provincial taxes on cannabis. As opposed to the liquor model, the AGLC does not collect or 
report on these funds. While the alcohol industry is expected to increase in future sales, cannabis 
projections are rather grim in comparison. Though the province of Alberta has done well in 
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tackling legalization and maximizing opportunity for retailers, the first year of 2018-2019 
reported a $34 million loss with more losses expected: $31 million in 2019-2020, $34 million in 
2020-2021 and $24 million in 2021-2022.68 Cannabis consumption has been weaker than 
projected, which has set Alberta back slightly. However, in a free-market, the opportunity for 
new ideas and growth may inspire future sales. 
The analysis in this paper is limited to Canadian examples. Other countries and areas of 
the world have had cannabis legalized for quite some time and may have worked out solutions to 
certain challenges and problems Canada has not encountered yet. A cross-province analysis of all 
of Canada may also be insightful as well for how the country can use a free-market approach as a 
whole. Although the first year has been full of trial and error, it has allowed the sale of cannabis 
to be examined as an efficient business model. This paper is limited by the number of cases and 
amount of data available for Ontario and Alberta. To further understand this system, an analysis 
of the licensed producer and retailer relationship would be insightful. 
Future research could generate comparisons between cannabis and alcohol. The Ontario 
Conservative government’s alcohol-focused budget may allow additional research to focus on 
impaired driving and cannabis.69 Currently, the driving regulations maintain a zero tolerance for 
anyone 21 and under holding a G1, G2, M1 or M2 license, anyone driving an A-F license for 
commercial vehicles, as well as anyone driving a road-building device. The penalties include 
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license suspensions and financial repercussions in addition to government education and 
treatment programs for repeat offenders. This “zero tolerance” approach exempts medical 
cannabis users to some degree, although they will still face penalties and criminal repercussions 
if they have been impaired while driving. Ontario’s website explains how to avoid impaired 
driving and describes how long the amount of time being “high” can last as well as the 
breakdown of THC levels in the body. Within individual communities, the police enforcement 
units are becoming more familiar with the new forms of licensing and regulations as well as how 
to designate growing operations, processing operations and cannabis retail operations within 
their communities.70  
Currently under government control, cannabis consumption can be monitored more 
closely than it had been with the illicit market. Through private retail and free-market vendors, 
there is the potential to create an industry with the promise of growth. With the proper decision-
making and rational thinking, a policy maker could use the information provided by research 
available to create changes that would allow all of Canada to benefit. Analyzing any future 
amendments and public opinion changes on provincial legalization of cannabis could prove 
beneficial. Moreover, analysis of the illicit market and the success of the free-market approach 
cross-Canada when businesses are privatized and not monopolized by the government would 
create valuable information. Although the literature available on cannabis is still emerging, these 
findings are crucial to building future cannabis profits. 
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